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Judith Resnik*
I encountered gender bias early in my teaching career. When I started
teaching in large law school classes in the late 1970s, a colleague gave me
what he took to be very kind advice. He said:
Be careful. Don't teach in any areas associated with women's issues. Don't
teach family law; don't teach sex discrimination. Teach the real stuff, the
hard stuff: contracts, torts, procedure, property. And be careful-don't be
too visible on women's issues.
At that time, I was working on articles about procedure, habeas corpus, and
women in prison. I taught and wrote about all three topics. After a few
years, I had to admit that my colleague's remarks were descriptively close to
the mark. My virtually all-male colleagues were more interested in my work
on procedure and federal courts, and less interested in my work on women
in prisons. It was clear that, in those days, being a "player" in the legal
academy meant playing in the "big time"-and the big time did not include
issues associated with women.
I have told this anecdote before,' and by its telling learned that my expe-
rience is neither idiosyncratic nor a tale particular to any law school in the
United States. Unfortunately, this description is also not only of historical
interest. In 1990, as chair of the Section on Women in Legal Education of
the American Association of Law Schools, I repeatedly heard about the risks
of being identified with "women's issues." Within the academic community,
examples are legion of disinterest as well as hostility to feminist scholarship
and commentary.
Thus, the advice ("stay away from 'women's issues' ") is still given. But
something has changed. Think about the words: "Be careful; don't teach in
any area associated with women's issues." What is the referent for "women's
issues"? The assumption is that there is a discrete set of concerns (family
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law? sex discrimination?) that are cabined, limited, and walled off from the
rest of the stuff of law. The suggestion made is that, if one steers clear of
these topics, one is home safe, free from the taint of being labeled a "light-
weight" because of one's association with women's issues.
But in the decade plus since I first heard that advice, another lesson has
also emerged: There are no safe harbors (if that is what one is seeking) from
having to think about the implications of gender. "Women's issues" are a
part of all subjects in the law school's curriculum. I am a teacher of proce-
dure and federal courts, as well as of feminism. In my classes, how women
and men are treated-as litigants, lawyers, judges, witnesses-is an impor-
tant aspect of the classroom discussion. Similarly, my colleagues who teach
contracts, torts, and property, think about the relationship between those
subjects and gender.2 Teaching about the federal courts has not insulated
me from having to ask about the relationship between law and women and
thus has not shielded me from whatever taint comes with being "visible on
women's issues."
All of the members of the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force were
appointed because of our expertise in the federal courts-as judges, liti-
gators, or social scientists who do research on federal adjudication. None of
us specialize in family or sex discrimination law, but all of us do specialize in
thinking about the federal courts. When considering issues of contemporary
concern to the federal courts, the topic of gender in general and women in
particular emerges. As the Task Force's Preliminary Report3 makes plain,
all areas of federal law are connected to and affect "women"-and, unfortu-
nately, can provide occasions for gender bias.
One can say with pride that the Ninth Circuit has taken a leadership role
in highlighting the connection between federal law and gender. The infor-
mation provided in the Task Force Report is the result of a truly pioneering
study, the first in the federal courts to address gender bias. But amidst the
pleasure of beginning this work, we also need to pause to examine the his-
tory, and to note with some sadness that the federal courts-until today-
have lagged far behind the states in a willingness to address whether and to
what extent invidious biases affect their courtrooms.
A decade ago (at the time when I was being warned off women's issues),
the state courts were unabashedly beginning to take up the problem. Begin-
2. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987);
Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REv. 421 (1992);
Marjorie Maguire Shultz, The Gendered Curriculum of Contracts and Careers, 77 IowA L. REv. 55
(1991); Jean Love, Bringing Gender Issues into the Torts Course, Torts and Retorts (Association of
American Law Schools, Section on Torts-Compensation Systems), Fall 1989, at 4. See generally
Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal Scholarship: A Bibliography, 77 IoWA L.
REV. 87 (1991) (including references to feminist scholarship throughout the legal curriculum).
3. See Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, Executive Summary of the Preliminary Re-
port of the Ninth Circuit Task Force on Gender Bias, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2153 (1993) [hereinafter
Ninth Circuit Executive Summary]; THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENDER
BIAS TASK FORCE: DIsCUSSION DRAFr (1992) [hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT].
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ning in 1982, state judiciaries began to address gender bias by setting up
research committees and task forces. Two years later, New Jersey issued the
first report.4 By 1988, the Chief Justices of the state courts had endorsed a
resolution, calling for study of racial, ethnic, and gender bias in their courts.5
But it was not until August 5, 1992 that, for the first time in the history of
the federal judiciary, a circuit judicial conference devoted a day to this issue.
That the Ninth Circuit's work is pioneering prompts not only pride but also
questions: Why did it take the federal courts so long? How come the state
courts took the lead? Is there something in the workplace, jurisdiction, or
ideology of the federal courts that led them-us-to sit back and think that
the problem of discrimination against women was one "for the state courts?"
One might respond to this question with the comment: Who cares?
Who cares that the states came first, and the federal courts second? There is
good reason to consider the chronology. One important way in which gen-
der bias operates against women is to make women invisible, to marginalize
us, and to assume that what we do is not of great moment or of public signif-
icance (just "housekeeping"). 6 The length of time it took for the federal
courts even to ask the "gender" question is thus itself an example of gender
bias. And not all the federal courts have yet addressed the issue. As of
1992, the only federal courts to have signed onto the enterprise of examining
how gender operates in their courthouses are the Ninth Circuit and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
Therefore, we have good reason to probe what stands in the way of the
federal courts embarking on this project. The answers come in part from the
history and the jurisprudence of the federal courts. Looking at the literature
about the federal courts, evidence of this form of gender bias-ignoring or
marginalizing women-is plentiful. One can read all of the reports, begin-
ning in the 1940s, of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
7
or the speeches on the "state of the judiciary" given by Chief Justices since
Warren Burger,8 or the more than thirty reports issued in 1992 by federal
district courts working in compliance with the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 9-and find hardly a mention of the problems encountered by women as
4. FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN
THE COURTS (1984) [hereinafter FIRST YEAR NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE].
5. Conference of Chief Justices, Resolution XVIII: Task Forces on Gender Bias and Minority
Concerns, Cr. REv., Fall 1989, at 5.
6. See Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial
Courts, 24 GA. L. REv. 909 (1990).
7. The Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts has filed an "Annual
Report," describing the "business" of the courts since 1940. See 28 U.S.C. § 604(a)(3) (1988) (re-
quiring such reports). Each annual report is printed as a section of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
8. Chief Justice Warren Burger began this practice in 1970. Chief Justice William Rehnquist
has continued to provide "Year-End" reports since he assumed the position of chiefjustice. See, eg.,
William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD
BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 1.
9. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 11 1990)).
Plans are required by 28 U.S.C. § 472 (Supp. I 1990). As of the summer of 1992, more than 30
districts have filed "civil justice reform act" plans and reports; women appeared only through the
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litigants, lawyers, and judges.'0 There is little interest in how the federal
courts affect women or are affected by women."
Legal education has also played an important role in making women in-
visible in the federal courts. It is not only the reports written about and by
the federal judiciary that assume the absence of women and women's con-
cerns from the federal judicial agenda. The textbooks, casebooks, and horn-
books of the federal courts also reflect and create this assumption. A review
of contemporary books finds little mention of women as a category of liti-
gants. In contrast, in the earliest materials developed in the first part of this
century to teach students about the federal courts, the question of whether
women had the legal capacity to be litigants in the federal courts occupied
teachers and students. 12 As we women have gained legal recognition as ju-
ridical actors within the federal courts, the question of the treatment of wo-
men by the federal courts has moved off stage.
Another part of the explanation for the invisibility of women in the fed-
eral judiciary comes from data about the employees of the federal courts and
about the demographics of those who practice before these courts. As a
workplace, the federal courts are a setting in which women-as lawyers and
judges-are few in number. As of 1991, 60 of the 94 district courts across
the country had no women Article III judges. Four of the thirteen appellate
courts had no women appellate judges. As of June, 1992, the United States
Supreme Court had appointed special masters more than 80 times: All of
those appointed were men. The absence of women from the higher levels of
occasional use of a pronoun. See, eg., Cost and Delay Reduction Plans for Southern District of
Illinois 3 (Dec. 27, 1991) (but using "he" and "his" in discussion of expert witnesses); Cost and
Delay Reduction Plans for Southern District of Indiana 10 (Dec. 18, 1991); Cost and Delay Reduc-
tion Plans for Southern District of Texas 3 (Oct. 24, 1991); Cost and Delay Reduction Plans for
Southern District of California 2 (Oct. 7, 1991).
10. A few of the speeches Chief Justice Burger gave from 1970 to 1985 mention women. See,
e.g., Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 443 (1983)
(noting "difficult and complex cases arising out of long overdue recognition of the rights of women
and of minorities"); Warren E. Burger, Annual Report to the American Bar Association by the Chief
Justice of the United States, 67 A.B.A. J. 290, 290 (1981) (discussing survey finding that "46 per cent
of women and 48 per cent of blacks are 'significantly frightened' by pervasive crime.").
In 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist made reference to the Violence Against Women Act, which
would create a federal civil rights action over claims of violence motivated by gender-based animus.
The Chief Justice noted the opposition of the Judicial Conference to the creation of such federal
jurisdiction and discussed the importance of reserving the federal courts "for issues where important
national interests predominate." Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 2-3.
11. Indeed, a recently published report about the future of the federal courts concluded that
"[a]lthough we have confidence that the quality of the federal bench and the nature of federal law
keep such problems [of gender bias] to a minimum, it is unlikely that the federal judiciary is totally
exempt from instances of this general social problem." FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE,
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (1990).
12. See, e.g., Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (while females were "citi-
zens," the right to vote did not necessarily inhere in the right of citizenship; a Missouri law provid-
ing only men with the right to vote did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment), discussed in
GEORGE W. RIGHTMIRE'S CASES AND READING ON THE JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS 266 (1917). For discussion of the history of this aspect of federal courts' jurispru-
dence, see Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts.
66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1682, 1735-50 (1991).
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the workforce could well engender a sense that this workplace did not have
much to do with women.
Invisible in the literature of the federal courts. In small numbers in the
workplace of the federal courts. And yet a third place in which women are
written out of the federal courts is in false assumptions made about the juris-
dictional authority of the federal courts. A superficial understanding of the
distinctions between state and federal jurisdiction creates an impression that
"women's issues"-in the traditional sense-are not much a part of what
federal judges have the power to address. Evidence of gender bias can be
found in the very description of how litigation is allocated between the state
and federal courts and in the assumptions made about the jurisdictional
boundaries of the federal courts.
To be sure, there are the obvious examples of cases involving "women's
issues" that are acknowledged as occupying an important place on the fed-
eral docket: equal protection, reproductive rights, and Title VII litigation.
These cases are, however, a small piece of the federal docket, and they cabin
women in narrow roles. Aside from discrimination litigation, many people
assume that "women's cases" are primarily "family cases"-about issues
such as divorce, custody, and how to find protection from violence. A fur-
ther assumption is that state courts do such "domestic relations" cases and
that the federal courts do the "national" work, often described as the public
world of commerce, constitutional law, and the federal statutory regime.
This assumption about the division of labor between state and federal courts
finds expression in the judge-crafted "domestic relations" exception to diver-
sity jurisdiction, which operates at a doctrinal level to express the perceived
barrier between the federal courts and "domestic life." 13 The twin assump-
tions-federal courts do not do family law and women's issues are primarily
about state-based family law-readily support a conclusion that discrimina-
tion against women in the courts is not much a federal problem, but proba-
bly a major issue for the states.
But the findings of the Ninth Circuit Task Force belie both these as-
sumptions. First and foremost, women are in the federal docket-as liti-
gants-across a wide spectrum of cases, criminal and civil. The sample of
lawyers who practice criminal law reported that 20 percent of the defendants
they saw were women. 14 About half the beneficiaries of federal benefits
15
13. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992) (holding that the domestic relations
exception is an interpretation of the reach of the statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction and is
limited to excluding cases involving divorce, alimony, and child custody); see also note 22 infra and
accompanying text.
The case usually cited as the source of that doctrine is Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582
(1859), which actually held that a federal court in a diversity case could hear a former wife's claim of
her husband's failure to pay alimony awarded in a state case. Id. at 591-600. Rogers Smith has
described Barber as "the closest the Supreme Court came to enunciating a liberal egalitarian view of
the status of women during the antebellum years." Rogers M. Smith, "One United People" Second-
Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, I YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 229, 254
(1989).
14. NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 144.
15. Id. at 95.
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and half the immigrants are women.1 6 One study of consumer bankruptcies
has found that, in 75 percent of the cases sampled, a woman was the debtor,
filing either singly or jointly.1 7 In the Task Force's review of cases involving
sexual harassment that resulted in opinions published within this Circuit
over a five year period, 92 percent were filed by or on behalf of women. 18 In
short, women are in the federal courts in cases that cut across the federal
docket, and women's legal problems are not limited to the problems they
encounter in-or attempting to exit-families.
Recall that the other assumption is that the federal courts don't "do"
family law. But what the Ninth Circuit Task Force learned is that the fed-
eral courts have a lot more to do with "family" law than many want to
admit. Since the New Deal, Congress has legislated extensively about family
life, and these "federal laws of the family" bring the federal judiciary into a
host of problems. However, these laws are not called family law but rather
pension, tax, social welfare, and bankruptcy law. For example, in 1984,
Congress created federal marital property law by amending the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to provide protection for surviv-
ing spouses. 19 Family life is similarly affected by federal tax and social wel-
fare laws that define households, who heads them, and who are dependents.
Bankruptcy law addresses how the filing of bankruptcy affects obligations to
pay spouses and children. While federal law forbids discharging debts in
bankruptcy for family support, the order of payment among creditors during
bankruptcy is not statutorily specified, nor is it always easy to distinguish
those debts that are "support" (and not dischargeable) from those that are
"property" debts that can be discharged. 20 Immigration law now provides
that the requirement that husband and wife fie a joint petition for perma-
nent status can be waived upon a showing of battering or other forms of
spousal abuse.21 Federal authority over major crimes on Indian reservations
within the United States has required federal judges to decide issues related
to women as victims of violence.
16. Id. at 105; see also UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, DE-
PARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1990 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZA-
TION SERVICE.
17. See TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 150 (1989).
18. NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 113.
19. ERISA was amended by the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat.
1426 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450,
1452 (9th Cir. 1991), is one of the leading cases on the question of the relationship between state
family law regimes and federal marital property pension law rights.
20. See, eg., In re Pacana, 125 B.R. 19 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991); Michaela M. White, Spousal
and Child Support Payment Provisions in Chapter 13 Plans, 16 CAP. U. L. REV. 369 (1987).
21. In relevant part the regulations state:
A conditional resident who entered into the qualifying marriage in good faith, and who was
battered or was the subject of extreme cruelty or whose child was battered by or was the
subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by the United States citizen or permanent resident
spouse during the marriage, may request a waiver of the joint filing requirement.
8 C.F.R. § 216.5 (e)(3) (1992); see Janet M. Calvo, Spouse-Based Immigration Laws: The Legacies of
Coverture, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 593 (1991).
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Let me be clear. State law retains enormous power over the status of
individuals as married, divorced, parent, and child. But federal legislation of
this century has given the federal courts authority over a myriad of eco-
nomic issues that also structure family life. The world of family law is
jointly governed by federal and state law, with varying degrees of jointness
depending on the issue. Indeed, the recent Supreme Court decision, Anken-
brandt v. Richards,22 underscores that the limitations on federal court juris-
diction over "domestic relations" is narrow; federal courts may decline to
hear cases under this exception only if those lawsuits are fied under the
diversity statute and only if divorce, custody, or alimony are at issue.
To summarize, the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force asked the
"where are the women?" question at several levels: Where are women
among the professionals and non-professionals within the courthouse as a
workplace? Where are women as litigants? Where are women within the
jurisprudence of the federal courts? The Task Force found women materi-
ally present (although in small numbers as lawyers and judges) but ideologi-
cally absent. Women are everywhere in the federal courts, but no one-until
this study-paid much attention. This silence is a form of gender bias, and
the work of the Ninth Circuit begins a process of ending that form of dis-
crimination and of understanding the federal adjudicatory world as one that
includes women, both out of and as members of families.
We then asked the next question: Does being a woman matter, in terms
of process or outcome? Note that while we (like many of the other task
forces) use the term "gender bias," rather than terms like "sex discrimina-
tion" or "bias against women," much of our focus has, in fact, been on wo-
men. These two choices, the deployment of the generic "gender" and the
focus on women, need therefore to be explained. During much of the 1970s,
scholars and lawyers used the term "sex discrimination" to refer to problems
of discrimination encountered by women. In the 1980s, concerns emerged
about how the use of the term "sex" might suggest or justify "natural" dis-
tinctions between women and men. Scholars and practitioners turned to the
word "gender" to underscore that "gender is not a unitary, or 'natural' fact,
but takes shape in concrete, historically changing social relationships. '23 As
Joan Wallach Scott has defined the term, gender "means knowledge about
sexual difference... produced by cultures and societies of human relation-
ships .... -24 By using the words "gender bias," we are therefore able to
attend to the construction of attributes and assumptions about women and
men within a gender system and are not lulled into assumptions about some
imagined "state of nature."
But deployment of the word "gender" also brings its own concerns; since
we all have "gender," one might claim that the problems encountered by
22. 112 S. Ct. 2206 (1992); see also note 13 supra.
23. Barrie Thorne, Cheris Kranarae & Nancy Henley, Introduction to LANGUAGE, GENDER,
AND SOCIETY: OPENING A SECOND DECADE OF RESEARCH IN LANGUAGE GENDER AND SOCIETY
7, 16 (Barrie Thorne, Cheris Kramarae & Nancy Henley eds., 1983).
24. JOAN vALLACH SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY 2 (1988).
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women and men are equivalent, and that the ongoing struggle for women's
equality might become blurred by the choice of language.25 Therefore, the
decision to use the concept of gender to underscore the unnaturalness of the
inequalities between women and men must be balanced by a second choice,
to focus on the harms that the current gender system does to women. 26 Here
again, the Ninth Circuit Task Force's concern about women is shared with
other gender bias task forces; we, like them, are thus subjected to the ques-
tion of whether the focus on women reflects our own bias, against men.
As is explained in the Preliminary Report, we did not at the outset im-
pose any one definition of bias; indeed, we did not look for bias, per se, but
rather for the effects, if any, of gender.27 Our findings comport with those of
other gender bias task forces; women reported the bulk of the gender-based
problems. While men on rare occasions described being the victims of gen-
der bias, women disproportionately felt the injuries of gender. Thus, the
discussion centers on the difficulties encountered by women, but, as the re-
port indicates, we did find a few instances (such as sentencing) in which
gender may work to women's advantage-or more accurately, to the advan-
tage of white women in certain roles.
The effects of gender in sentencing illuminate two other important as-
pects of discussions of gender bias: that discrimination against men takes
forms different from that against women, and that "men" and "women"
may themselves be too general terms. The concern that women are treated
"better" by prosecutors in bargaining over charges or sentences is the subject
of this Circuit's Redondo-Lemos opinion.28 As that case details, the claim of
gender bias harming men is based on the assumption that men are more
important actors (in this context, more likely to be culpable criminally) than
are women, who when involved in crimes are assumed to occupy traditional
women's roles. The cultural bias that perceives women as marginal and less
important actors is here turned into women's advantage. Trivialization of
25. See generally Christine A. Littleton, Does It Still Make Sense to Talk about "Women', 1
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 15 (1991).
26. The titles of 24 published reports reflect both the deployment of the term "gender" and the
focus on women. Seven use the word "women" in the title of the report. See, eg., LOUSIANA TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, FINAL REPORT (Louisiana, 1992); FINAL REPORT OF THE
NEW MEXICO STATE BAR TASK FORCE ON WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (New Mexico,
1990); FIRST YEAR NEW JERSEY TASK FORCE, supra note 4. Fourteen reports use "gender." See
e.g., REPORT OF THE CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE, GENDER, JUSTICE AND THE COURTS (Connecti-
cut, 1991); COLORADO SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS, GENDER
& JUSTICE IN THE COLORADO COURTS (Colorado, 1990) [hereinafter COLORADO TASK FORCE];
FINAL REPORT OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON GENDER ISSUES IN THE
COURTS (Michigan, 1989). Two used "gender" and referred to "women and men" in their titles.
See KENTUCY TASK FORCE ON GENDER FAIRNESS AND THE COURTS, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ,Vo-
MEN AND MEN (Kentucky, 1992); ACHIEVING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE
COURTS, DRAFT REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENDER BIAS IN
THE COURTS (California, 1990). One used "equal justice" and made no reference to either women
or men or gender. See WISCONSIN EQUAL JUSTICE TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT (Wisconsin,
1991).
27. Ninth Circuit Executive Summary, supra note 3, at 2154-55.
28. United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir.), as amended on denial ofrehg,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 10071 (1992) (en banc).
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the role of women works to harm men because, in the criminal context, be-
ing viewed as a minor figure is the desired goal.
But experts on sentencing data also informed us that the assumption of
women's marginality may intersect with other biases. Although some wo-
men may have advantages in charge bargaining, those advantages may not
be available equally to all women. Claimed "advantages" of women may be
advantages that inure to white women, or women in certain kinds of crimi-
nal activity, or women in certain social settings. Thus, the words "women"
and "men" may at times be inadequate to capture the intersections of gen-
der, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and class.
Further, that women and men have different socially-ascribed roles may
also require that responses to gender bias take those differences into account.
Data on state prisoners report that nearly 80 percent of mothers as com-
pared to 50 percent of fathers lived with minor children before entering
prison. Ninety percent of males reported that their wives were caring for
their children during the time when they, the fathers, were incarcerated,
while 22 percent of the women reported that their husbands were caring for
their children when they, the mothers, were in prison.29 In quick transla-
tion, the data tell us what we know: Women are more often the caregiving
parents than are men.
In the federal system, contemporary sentencing law struggles with these
differences in women's and men's provision of child care. The United States
Sentencing Commission has determined that "family ties and responsibilities
... are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be
outside the applicable guideline range."' 30 Judges across the country find the
application of this rule troubling, as is illustrated by a series of opinions
discussing the sentencing of women who are primary caretakers of chil-
dren.31 Further, data on women and men in federal prisons illustrate other
29. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEPHANIE MINOR-
HARPER, WOMEN IN PRISON 6-7 (1991).
30. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5H1.6 (policy statement) (1993 ed.) issued in response to 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988),
which provides that guidelines and policies on sentencing should "reflect the general inappropriate-
ness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and responsibili-
ties and community ties of the defendants."
31. Several courts have held that the effect that sentencing a single parent to prison has on a
young child is not an "extraordinary" circumstance justifying a downward departure. See, eg.,
United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 334 (1992); United
States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1082 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th
Cir.), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 1014 (1990); United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 506-08 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 544 (1990);.
In contrast, the Second Circuit concluded that a single mother responsible for raising four
young children classified as extraordinary family circumstances that justified a substantial downward
departure. United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 127-30 (2d Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
Pena, 930 F.2d 1486, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding a downward departure based in part on
the fact that a woman was the sole support of two young children).
A number of federal district courts have also granted departures to single mothers, in part on
the basis of responsibility to family. See, ag., United States v. Gerard, 782 F. Supp. 913, 914-15
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (sole provider for two teenage children); United States v. Pokuaa, 782 F. Supp. 747
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (risk of loss of child custody); United States v. Floyd, 738 F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (D.
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differing impacts of incarceration. Women, who are a growing proportion of
incarcerated prisoners, are often incarcerated at great distances from their
homes-farther away in general than are men, for whom there are more
federal facilities. Not surprisingly, one study by the United States Bureau of
Prisons of four federal facilities also found that the children of male inmates
lived closer to the institutions at which a parent was incarcerated than did
the children of female inmates. 32
Thus the richness and complexity of the topic of gender bias is revealed:
that bias based on gender operates differently against women and men and
varies with sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, religion, and class; that given
the differing histories and social roles of women and men, the same treat-
ment of women and men may, when considered in context, constitute gender
bias toward women; and that all women and all men cannot be equated be-
cause of the importance of race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and class. The
Ninth Circuit Task Force has attempted to address some of this complexity,
as we explored the impact of gender in immigration, criminal justice, federal
benefits, and federal Indian law. However, we must note that there is much
more to know and that current data wrongly cabin our knowledge and un-
derstanding. For example, much of the available demographic information
relies on drawing distinctions between women and men, on the one hand,
and among "minorities" on the other-thus making invisible the woman
who is also a member of an ethnic or racial minority.
Therefore, the Task Force often asked, at the more general level, about
the experiences of women and men in the aggregate. We inquired: Does it
matter if one is a woman or a man when one is a litigant? This is a critical
question, to ensure that task forces do not look only to the internal workings
of court systems but also focus on a central purpose of court systems: re-
sponding to citizens' disputes. Given the many variables that affect adjudi-
cation, this central question is also the most difficult to answer. It is a lot
easier to report the number of women who hold a certain position than to
determine how gender affects the process and outcome of cases. To explore
preliminarily these issues of gender and adjudication, the Task Force relied
on Advisory Committees, comprised of individuals expert in particular areas
of law, who generously volunteered their time and undertook special
studies. 33
Minn. 1990) (single mother with four children between the ages of three months and nine years); see
also United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326, 1331-32 (8th Cir. 1990) (downward departure for a
man who supported his family).
32. NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 160 (citing OFFICE
OF RESEARCH AND EVALUATION BUREAU OF PRISONS, STEVEN MCPEEK & SHAU-FAI TSE, FINAL
REPORT: BUREAU OF PRISONS PARENTING PROGRAMS: USE, COSTS, AND BENEFITS 1 (1988)).
33. Six Advisory Committees were formed: the Advisory Committee on Federal Indian Law,
convened by Professor Barbara Atwood of the University of Arizona College of Law; the Advisory
Committee on Employment Law, convened by Carol Sobel of the American Civil Liberties Union of
Southern California; the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy, convened by the Honorable Lisa Hill
Fenning, Bankruptcy Judge of the Central District of California; the Advisory Committee on Immi-
gration, convened by Professors Evangeline Abriel of Loyola-New Orleans Law School, Carolyn
Patty Blum of Boalt Hall, Abby J. Liebman of the California Women's Center, Lynn Alvarez of the
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Credibility of women as witnesses emerged as a serious concern from
inquiries in several areas, including federal benefits, immigration, and em-
ployment law. Many reported that women litigants are assumed to be less
credible or their problems less important than those of men. The Task Force
learned that women's testimony may simply be thought to be complaints
about life, rather than as legally cognizable harms, and that, even when be-
lieved, women's injuries may be trivialized or viewed as not "worth much"
in monetary terms. These descriptions parallel those from state gender bias
task forces, which have addressed the treatment of women as witnesses in
other areas, such as domestic violence, but which have also reached similar
conclusions: Women are often disbelieved because they are women.
34
Moreover, even when believed, women's claims may be ignored or deval-
ued. Lawyers in federal employment cases reported their experiences before
district and magistrate judges who were not interested in these cases, de-
scribed as "small value" claims. In contrast, at the appellate level, the Ninth
Circuit has taken a leadership role in defining women's rights to be free from
unwanted sexual harassment: Ellison v. Brady's "reasonable woman" ap-
proach is based on the experiences of women.35 The Advisory Committee
on Employment Law looked at the 26 reported Ninth Circuit appellate cases
over the past five years involving sexual harassment; in 23 of the 26 cases,
defendants had prevailed at the trial level. In 52 percent of those trial court
wins, on appeal the decisions were reversed in part or in full on procedural
or substantive grounds. That reversal rate of 52 percent is much higher than
the 15 to 20 percent reversal rate for all private civil cases during the same
time period. Thus, the interplay described by the lawyers in this area-of
trial court disinterest as contrasted with appellate court leadership in under-
Immigration Rights Office, Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, Myrna Raeder of Southwestern
Law School and Elizabeth Atlee of the University of Southern California; the Advisory Committee
on Federal Benefits Law, convened by Professor Joan Schaffner of George Washington Law School;
the Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Issues, convened by Denise Meyer and Maria Valdez
of the Federal Public Defenders Office of Los Angeles, Professor Myrna Raeder, Maria E. Stratton
and Melissa N. Widdifield of Talcott, Lightfoot, Vandevelde, Woehrle & Sadowsky, and Lee
Seltman and Heidi Binford of the University of Southern California.
34. Almost all of the published gender bias task force reports address questions of credibility,
as parts of discussions of domestic violence, sexual assault, courtroom interaction, and rights sought
by women litigants under employment and federal benefits law. Many of the reports detail the
specific problems faced by women testifying about sexual aggression. Illustrative is the finding of the
District of Columbia that "cross-examination of victims tends to be more hostile in sexual assault
cases than in other assault cases." THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON RACIAL AND
ETHNIC BIAS AND TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 119 (District of Columbia,
1992); see also COLORADO TASK FORCE, supra note 26, at 92; GENDER AND JUSTICE IN THE
COURTS: A REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA BY THE COMMISSION ON GENDER
BIAS IN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM 93-94 (1991); THE 1990 REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS TASK FORCE ON
GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 106 (1990); REPORT OF THE GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 107-108 (Massachusetts, 1989).
When discussing "domestic" violence, several reports describe how victims are blamed, are
accused of provoking attacks, are treated as though their experiences are trivial, and are disbelieved.
See, eg., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL JOINT COMMITrEE ON GENDER BIAS IN THE COURTS 3-5
(Maryland, 1989); MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE FOR GENDER FAIRNESS IN THE
COURTS, reprinted in 15 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 825, 875-77 (1989).
35. 924 F.2d 872, 878-80 (9th Cir. 1991).
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standing the rights of women-can be found in the case law as well as in the
experiences of members of this segment of the bar.
Although the work on substantive areas of law is preliminary in nature,
much of it is remarkably consistent. Our data came from many sources and
in many forms. Across subject matters and districts, we heard overlapping
and corroborating reports. We heard that gender counts, that in adjudica-
tion, whether you are a woman or a man affects the courtroom, the cham-
bers conference, the perception of your credibility, the amount of damages
you may receive, or the view of the importance of your claim.
But, as our data detail, we also learned that, if you are a male lawyer or
male judge, you are less likely to perceive gender as having any relevance.
We heard reports from men, lawyers and judges, that there is "no gender
bias" or precious little of it.36 In contrast, almost all women-be they ad-
ministrative law judges, trial judges or appellate judges, trial lawyers, part-
ners at large firms or in small practices, old or young-reported "some" to
"frequent" instances of gender bias. We were particularly conscious of one
aspect of the data, that neither age nor professional role explains differences
in perceptions of the existence and frequency of gender bias. Whether older
or younger members of the bar or bench, men saw the world one way, wo-
men another.
What explains these differences in perceptions? One lawyer (in the hun-
dreds of handwritten "margin" comments that we received) offered an ex-
planation: "One of us, either you or I, is living in Disneyland." T37 The Task
Force offers other interpretations, less fantastical. First, women and men do
not always have the same experiences. A few years ago, I stood up in a
court, about to make a formal motion, and was greeted with a judge asking
what I, "a lady lawyer," wanted. 38 I was then asked by the marshal how I
could be cute and yet efficient. The court clerk said to me later: "Come
back, we make home movies on the weekends." Obviously, male lawyers
have not often been the recipients of such comments, but almost every wo-
man lawyer and judge can tell a variant of this very story.
So, of course, women and men have different experiences in the court-
room, on and off the record. But women and men may also have the same
experiences, hear the same words, see the same events, yet understand them
differently. If I sit in a room as one of 16 women in a room of 100 men
(which is the ratio of women to men in the bar of the Ninth Circuit), I may
well experience that meeting as a place with very few women, and maybe feel
a bit daunted. I might wonder how welcome I am, think about what if any-
36. As one male lawyer put it: "I have never witnessed nor heard of a single incident of gender
bias." Christine Carr, Compilation and Analysis of the Margin Comment Responses to the Ninth
Circuit Gender Bias Task Force's Surveys, Working Paper prepared for the Ninth Circuit Gender
Bias Task Force (June, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter Margin
Comments].
37. NINTH CIRCuIT TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 172.
38. Although separated in time by some 75 years, Clara Foltz and I were both addressed as the
"lady lawyer." See Barbara Allen Babcock, Western Women Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2179, 2184
(1993).
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thing to say, and, if I speak, be aware of myself as disproportionately visible.
Women lawyers and judges told us repeatedly about their sense of isolation
and of being out of place and their struggle to feel comfortable. As one
woman put it, the federal courts remain "a bastion of male lawyers." An-
other described the conflict-between appearing "ladylike" and passive, and
receiving complaints from men about being insufficiently aggressive, or ap-
pearing forceful and aggressive, and then being subjected to accusations of
being "emotional," "strident," or "argumentative." She continued: Gender
bias "places an additional burden on women lawyers who are constantly
having to engage in a balancing act just to do" their job.
39
Many male white lawyers may sit in rooms full of colleagues and have a
sense of comfort, of place, and of belonging to the club. They may be oblivi-
ous to gender or may, if they notice and reflect on the presence of women at
all, think that there are a fair number of women. Women's sense of being
out of place is reinforced by interactions among colleagues and opponents in
the informal settings of pretrial conferences, in the administrative adjudica-
tory arena that generates records for the appellate and trial courts to review,
and sometimes in the very rules of law.
Participating in the Task Force provided another window into the exper-
iences of derogation and trivialization that women sometimes face. As de-
tailed by Dr. Hensler, 4° the Task Force received an unusually large number
of hand-written margin comments, for which we are very grateful. While
many offered support, amplification, and assistance, some of those comments
were pretty angry: ranging from telling us that this activity was stupid and
wasteful ("a complete waste of time and money!"; "a pile of garbage";
"much ado about nothing") to telling us that we were doing something
harmful by asking questions about gender. One comment, by a male lawyer,
summed up many: "Why the Ninth Circuit should focus on gender bias is
beyond me when there are real legitimate problems within the Ninth Circuit
which are not being addressed."'
41
We on the Task Force have compared notes with members of other spe-
cial committees of the Ninth Circuit-who worked on projects such as sanc-
tions against lawyers and judges imposed under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the role of magistrate judges. Those groups did not
receive comments of a similar tenor; obviously, the world of gender is differ-
ent. Whatever passions we feel about Rule 11 (and they run high), those
feelings are somewhere away from ourselves, and not quite so close to home
as what we feel when the topic is gender. On a daily basis, inquiries about
gender strike home, as tied up with our identities and the way we view the
world. At times, both women and men share the feeling that these questions
are close-indeed, too close-for comfort. That proximity translates, some-
39. Margin Comments, supra note 36.
40. Deborah R. Hensler, Studying Gender Bias in the Courts: Stories and Statistics, 45 STAN. L.
REv. 2187, 2193 (1993).
41. Margin Comments, supra note 36; see also NINTh CIRCUIT TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY
REPORT, supra note 3, at 179.
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times into a reticence, sometimes into a nervousness, laughter and jokes, and
sometimes into hostility.
Thus, the work of this and other Task Forces is truly challenging. How
can we talk about gender issues? How can we bridge experiences that are so
disparate? The perceptions that differ so radically? Can we talk to each
other openly and admit the pain, isolation, and injury that many women
reported to us-and still adhere to commitments to equal justice? And still
see women as powerful lawyers and judges even as these women admit their
sense of isolation and the perceptions of vulnerability in a workplace so dom-
inated by men? Let me underscore this point: Being powerful is an essential
element of being an effective lawyer or judge. Women who admit the fragil-
ity of their position within the federal courts are at risk of reminding their
colleagues that we, women, fear disparate treatment. Women lawyers are in
an especially precarious position, for we are not only personally vulnerable,
our clients are vulnerable as well.
The Task Force heard these concerns repeatedly. One woman lawyer
wrote on the questionnaire: "I've been addressed as 'hon' by a senior judge
in this district. I was mildly offended but, because he was a judge and my
client was at his mercy, [I was] helpless to respond."42 Another reported
that she had complied with a magistrate judge who requested that she leave
the room so that he could tell "a dirty joke during a settlement conference."
She feared she would jeopardize her clients' interests if she refused.43 These
concerns about complaining are well-founded; one runs the risk of appearing
inappropriately sensitive or insufficiently powerful. As one male lawyer
wrote: "There are a small number of female attorneys.., who seem to infer
gender bias from almost any situation. These attorneys can be very unpleas-
ant to be around and, in my opinion, hurt their clients' cause." 44 Another
stated that "only big boys and big girls are in federal courts, [and] we should
be able to take care of ourselves."'45
We on the Task Force understand the instincts to appear invulnerable to
insult, as well as the desire to bury or to ignore the differences, and to forge
on in the hopes that gender distinctions will just dissipate over time. We
wish we could be confident that such an approach would suffice, but unfortu-
nately our data provide no such solace. Serious problems, of communica-
tion, process, and outcome need to be addressed. How does one change
attitudes, ideology, workplaces? In some sense, courts-both state and fed-
eral-face these problems everyday when they have to craft remedies to ad-
dress legal wrongs. That is the next step, but this work cannot be delegated
to a Task Force or to any small set of people. The work of responding to
gender bias is work that must proceed not only at this conference, and then
at the district-by-district level, but also over time, by succeeding generations.
42. Margin Comments, supra note 36.
43. NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 60.
44. Id. at 55.
45. Margin Comments, supra note 36.
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While the Task Force's Preliminary Report offered a series of conclu-
sions about what we have found, at this stage, we deliberately declined to set
forth our own recommendations. We believe that we must develop re-
sponses and solutions collectively. As this remedial work proceeds, we are
concerned that the problem of segregation with which I began remains rele-
vant. For many, "women's issues" continue to be perceived as a discrete set
of narrowly-focused problems, cabined off from the full panoply of issues
that confront the federal courts, and so, if thought about at all, considered in
one context and then ignored. While we rejoice in the dedication of a day of
the 1992 Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference to gender bias, we are concerned
that participants not walk away with the view that one has done "it," and
can now move on. But when considering the other topics of the federal
courts agenda, such as the two in this Conference's other programs-long
range planning and civility-one needs to ask about gender as well. One
long range goal should be to integrate the federal courts as a workplace in
which all can feel a part. And as one thinks about civility, one should re-
member the comment of one woman lawyer: "[U]ncivil behavior occurs with
uncivil attorneys, and uncivil attorneys are more uncivil to members of the
opposite sex."'46 All three topics-long range planning, gender bias, and ci-
vility-share a common goal: the search to reframe the administration of
justice to conduct the business of the Ninth Circuit in a manner that
welcomes all citizens and lawyers as participants, to enable the courts to
hear what both men and women have to say, and to create an atmosphere in
which there is permission to speak-even about painful issues of courts as
places of discrimination.
46. The interrelatedness of the issue of civility and the problems of bias based on gender, race,
or ethnicity have not been addressed by some engaged in the "civility" debate. See, eg., Interim
Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 371 (1991);
Final Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. at 441
(1991) (neither address the effects of gender, race, or ethnicity).
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